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Hegel and the Matter of Poetry 
 
This essay addresses a simply stated question: What is poetry made from? That 
question may seem an unpromisingly straightforward one if we assume that the 
material bases of art forms are readily identifiable. The very name of painting 
tells us that it is made from paint, and it needn’t take extensive investigation to 
determine that it is also made from canvas or other suchlike substrate; even 
though sculpture doesn’t announce its material in its name, we may nonetheless 
forthrightly declare that sculpture is made of stone, wood, or other materials 
with comparable properties of malleability.  
 To be sure, answering the question ‘what is painting, or what is sculpture 
made from?’ need not lead to such statements of the obvious as this somewhat 
truncated overview might be taken to suggest. But all the same, the matter of 
poetry’s material does appear to be somewhat distinct. Even if an apparently 
direct answer to the question ‘what is poetry made from?’ is forthcoming, such as 
that poetry is made of language or of words – and it is striking, by the way, that 
such answers rarely are straightforwardly forthcoming – it would seem 
necessary to acknowledge that ‘language’ is not a material directly comparable to 
paint or stone. I want to pursue the question of what poetry is made from by 
means of examining some revealing moments in the thinking of G.W.F. Hegel, 
especially in his philosophy of art as it is presented in his Lectures on Fine Art, 
and in some of the ways that these moments have been interpreted. Although 
this essay is not intended as a systematic commentary on Hegel’s theory of 
poetry, nor, indeed, as a defence of Hegel’s ‘position’ on poetry, these moments in 
his aesthetics are nevertheless shown to be revealing about the precise contours 
of Hegel’s conception of the relation between matter and spirit in art, as well as 
about the material of poetry more particularly.  
 In turning to Hegel to think about the materiality of poetry, this essay 
follows a number of recent attempts to understand the materiality of painting – 
in particular, the significance of the materiality of painting to the emergence and 
development of Modernism – which have discovered in Hegel’s aesthetics fertile 
ground on which to explore this question. In Against Voluptuous Bodies, J.M. 
Bernstein’s wide-ranging discussion of Modernist painterly practice from 
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(surprisingly) Pieter de Hooch to Cindy Sherman, Bernstein takes Hegel’s 
aesthetics as offering – somewhat against the grain of their explicitly stated 
intention – a set of insights into the uncanny reliance of ostensibly living 
artworks on dead matter.1 More recently, in After the Beautiful: Hegel and the 
Philosophy of Pictorial Modernism, Robert B. Pippin wishes to recruit a 
distinctively Hegelian account of the history of art to an explanation of pictorial 
modernism in the wake of, above all, Manet (the other pictorial examples he 
discusses extensively are Cézanne and Picasso).2 Pippin’s account of art’s 
relation to material differs from Bernstein’s emphasis on Modernist painting’s 
problematizing of its own sensuous medium. Advancing, at least for the sake of 
argument, Hegel’s reading of Attic tragedy as having revealed a crisis in the 
structures of moral and ethical judgement in Ancient Greek society, Pippin asks 
how Hegel might correspondingly have interpreted the distinctive 
characteristics of pictorial Modernism. Modernist painters, according to Pippin, 
‘make paintings where objects seem to be dematerializing over historical time in 
succeeding generations’, a process culminating in ‘wholly nonrepresentational 
experiments’.3 Pippin’s account, therefore, focuses on the prehistory, as it were, 
to Bernstein’s more particular focus on painterly material. Pippin emphasises the 
steady waning of the materiality of represented objects, to the point where 
represented material objects disappear from painting altogether; Bernstein’s 
concern is rather with the reflection on its own materiality into which painting is 
forced as a result of the withdrawal of represented material. 
 In relation to his account of Modernist art, Pippin quotes Schelling’s 
‘prescient’ statement from The Philosophy of Art: ‘Matter gradually 
dematerializes into the ideal; in painting as far as the relative ideal, through light; 
then, in music and even more so in speech and poesy; into the genuinely ideal, 
the most complete manifestation of the absolute cognitive act.’4 The striking 
difference between Pippin’s narrative of the dematerialization of represented 
objects in painting, on the one hand, and Schelling’s account of the transition of 
matter into the ideal, on the other, lies in Schelling’s sense that different art 
forms occupy different stages of this process: while painting may begin the 
process of dematerialization, it is, for Schelling, poetry that most completes it. In 
focusing on the case of poetry, the present essay asks, by way of Hegel, quite how 
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complete that transition can be. Neither Bernstein nor Pippin comments 
substantially on Hegel’s account of poetry (nor do they, for that matter, comment 
on his account of art forms other than painting). Of course, there have been many 
discussions elsewhere of Hegel’s theory of poetry, but neither have these focused 
in detail on what I wish to argue is in fact the most suggestive aspect of Hegel’s 
conception of what poetry is made from – a conception that is distinctive, 
moreover, both in relation to Hegel’s own consideration of the matters of other 
art forms and in relation to attempts by other thinkers to grasp the materiality of 
poetry. For example, Frank Dietrich Wagner’s Hegels Philosophie der Dichtung 
dispatches the question of the materiality of art in general in Hegel’s thinking 
with remarkable alacrity: for Hegel, ‘its material underpinning is only an external 
and thereby inessential aspect of the artwork’, which explains why Hegel, 
according to Wagner, pays comparatively scant attention to the materials of the 
art forms, even though an artwork is first of all defined as an object through its 
materiality.5 Likewise, Gary Shapiro’s chief concern is to offer a sympathetic 
appraisal of what he takes to be Hegel’s assimilation of poetry to philosophy. In 
particular, Shapiro emphasises that Hegel has little time for the indefiniteness of 
meaning or the ineffability of experience that is apparently the frequent recourse 
of poetry, but instead views poetry as ‘the speculative comprehension of the 
dialectical nature of spirit.’6 Shapiro does briefly discuss the materiality of poetry 
in Hegel’s aesthetics, emphasising what Hegel himself presents as the nearly 
perfected diminution of matter in poetry, since, in Shapiro’s words, poetry’s 
‘imaginative medium is the finest attenuation of the sensory forms of the other 
arts’; ‘there is a progressive liberation from material and sensuous constraints 
[…] Poetry is an art in the process of dissolution, for its external and objective 
aspect is, paradoxically, "the inner imagination and intuition itself”’.7  
 The emphasis on poetry’s radical attenuation of sensuousness is echoed 
by other commentators on Hegel’s theory of poetry. In the course of his 
thoroughgoing discussion of the interpretation of language across Hegel’s 
oeuvre, Theodor Bodammer argues that, for Hegel, poetry departs from music 
since poetry’s specifically linguistic material is essentially spiritual and not 
merely, as in the case of music, sound (Ton).8 Thus poetry takes up ‘a transitional 
position between the other sensible art forms and the other kinds of 
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presentation of the absolute in religion and philosophy.’9 Significantly, however, 
Bodammer qualifies his preliminary focus on Hegel’s insistence on the spiritual 
character of poetry by stating that, in the final analysis, ‘insofar as art has to do 
with the reconciliation of spirit with the sensible, poetry must also, if it wants to 
be art, still have a sensible moment within itself.’10 
 The difficulty of the question of poetry’s materiality, implicitly posed by 
Bodammer, is clearly recognised in one of the most important contributions to 
the interpretation of Hegel’s aesthetics as a whole in the twentieth century, Peter 
Szondi’s lectures on ‘Hegels Lehre der Dichtung’. Szondi insists early in his 
commentary on the significance of materiality to Hegel’s aesthetics in general, 
emphasising that this entails not merely a focus on the individual art forms and 
genres, but on media such as ‘stone, sound, and speech’ themselves.11 However, 
Szondi views significant aspects of Hegel’s differentiation between sound in 
music, on the one hand, and in poetry, on the other, to be mistaken. Insofar as 
Hegel realises the fundamental distinction between sound in music and in poetry 
as predicated on the signifying function (Bedeutungsfunktion) that sound has in 
the latter case, but not in the former, then Hegel is correct. Szondi implies that 
Hegel nevertheless fundamentally overlooks the fact that ‘poetry [Dichtung] does 
not use speech merely as a medium of expression or signification, but rather 
poetry at the same time begins in its musical qualities.’12  
 As we will see, Szondi is certainly right about the letter of Hegel’s 
statement concerning poetry’s inessential relation to its linguistic medium and 
also right, in my view, that such a view is erroneous. Yet Hegel’s account of 
poetry cannot but return, at the most crucial moments of its articulation, to 
speech as more than ‘a medium of expression or signification’, to what Szondi 
calls the ‘musical qualities’ in which poetry ‘begins’. Partly in response to the 
readings of Hegel’s theory of poetry that I have briefly outlined, I want in what 
follows, first, to deepen the intractability that attaches to the question of what, as 
it were, a poem’s paint, canvas, wood, or stone, is, according to Hegel. As we have 
already seen, Bodammer intimates an important further question here: ‘poetry 
must also, if it wants to be art, still have a sensible moment within itself’.13 But 
does poetry want to be art`? While I do not directly answer that question (much 
more discussion would be required to do that than I have space for here), I do 
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emphasise that Hegel’s definition of poetry reveals it to be an art form 
dynamically poised against itself. Above all, I show that it is just at the moment of 
the ostensible diminution of materiality in art – a moment that occurs, according 
to Hegel’s explicit avowal, in poetry – that the materiality of art is the most 
emphatically announced, for it is at this moment that the spiritual is shown to be 
inextricably interwoven with matter in art. 
 
* 
One of the first tasks Hegel sets out to perform in his Aesthetics is to differentiate 
works of art from natural objects. This is surely a significant differentiation in 
any account of artworks, but it is a particularly important early step in Hegel’s 
argument because he wishes to refute the ‘ordinary way of looking at things’ and 
its alleged preference for natural objects over art objects. That preference is 
predicated on the assessment that the former are living, the latter, dead, and we 
are wont to value, so Hegel claims (and so likewise would proponents of the 
ordinary view claim), the living more highly than the dead – although, of course, 
the opposition between life and death is a frequently revisited and structuring 
concern of Hegel’s philosophy, rather than a merely common-sense assumption 
as it is on the ordinary view of things. Hegel argues that while it is unproblematic 
to concede that, understood from the point of view of verisimilitude, artworks 
are only superficially and, furthermore, apparently living, they are nevertheless 
alive in a more substantial way thanks to the spiritualizing effects of the artist’s 
making. This is how he puts his case: 
That the work of art has no life and movement in itself is readily granted. What is 
alive in nature is, within and without, an organism purposefully elaborated into all 
its tiniest parts, while the work of art attains the appearance of life only on its 
surface; inside it is ordinary stone, or wood and canvas, or, as in poetry, an idea 
expressed in speech and letters [oder, wie in der Poesie, Vorstellung ist, die in Rede 
und Buchstaben sich äußert]. But this aspect—external existence—is not what 
makes a work into a product of fine art; a work of art is such only because, 
originating from the spirit, it now belongs to the territory of the spirit; it has 
received the baptism of the spiritual and sets forth only what has been formed in 
harmony with the spirit.14 
 
As will no doubt immediately be realised, the fairly unproblematic précis of this 
argument that I gave in prefacing this quotation fails to take account of the many 
problematic intricacies in it. We ought first of all to notice how difficult it is here 
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to determine precisely what is the inside, and what the outside, of an artwork. In 
the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel had made clear that there is a crucial 
difference between living and non-living insides and outsides: 
The inorganic inner is a simple inner which presents itself to perception as a 
property that merely is; its determinateness is therefore essentially magnitude, 
and, as a property that merely is, it appears indifferent towards the outer, or the 
various sensuous properties. But the being-for-self of the living organism does not 
stand on one side in this way over against its outer; on the contrary, it has in its 
own self the principle of otherness.15 
 
The indifference on the part of the inorganic simple inner to what it would be an 
exaggeration to call its outer could equally well entail the former’s mere identity 
with the latter. The distinction between inner and outer in the inorganic is, 
basically, nugatory. This crucial moment in Hegel’s developing sense of the 
difference between the living and the dead is clearly behind the above passage in 
the Aesthetics. Moreover, philosophical considerations of the proper definitions 
of entities frequently deploy the terminology of inside and outside in a 
metaphorical – or at least potentially metaphorical – fashion. In the passage from 
the Aesthetics, however, such metaphorical usage exists side-by-side with an 
interest in what is literally beneath the verisimilar appearance of life on the 
surface of artworks. We may take a sculpture to look like a man and his sons 
being attacked by a snake, but the sceptical will find by means of the application 
of a chisel that, inside, it is just stone. We can see this clash of metaphorical and 
literal insides and outsides when, having described the mere materiality of the 
‘inside’ of artworks, Hegel goes on to dismiss this as belonging, along with the 
mere appearance of animation, to the ‘aspect [of] external existence’ of artworks. 
The stony inside of the Laocoön Group is, actually, part of its outside. Something 
similar seems to happen in the account-in-miniature of the origin of artworks 
and the process of their making. They at once originate in the spirit and only 
‘now’, having ‘received the baptism of the spirit’, belong to it – perhaps as if there 
had been a time when they didn’t. Both of these wrinkles in the texture of Hegel’s 
statement about the relation between natural material and artistic production 
are important because they show, even if implicitly, that what is material and 
what is spiritual in Hegel’s philosophy of art is not as finally settled as may 
initially appear to be the case. 
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Notably, the appearance of life presented by works of art plays no 
substantial role in Hegel’s account of the way in which artworks ought, in fact, to 
be considered as living. Artworks, that is, live not because they appear to do so, 
but because they have received the baptism of the spirit through the mediation 
of the artist. There is a subsidiary question here as to why some artworks want 
to appear, verisimilarly, to be alive, if that appearance of life is at once only 
illusory and, moreover, a distraction from the real life that they do, in Hegel’s 
account, have; but this is a question that we must leave to one side here. We 
must not be tempted, however, to leave to one side Hegel’s deployment of the 
term ‘baptism’ here, to categorise it as just a manner of speaking, since what he 
seeks to emphasise by using it is the expiation of materiality’s corruption 
performed exclusively by the artist’s activity: matter is incapable of achieving its 
own redemption to which task spiritual agency alone is sufficient.  
It is at this point, though, that we must begin to question whether the 
corrupt body of the artwork has, as it were, been finally divested, and it is here 
that I want to consider a bit more fully those contributions to the recent 
reception of Hegel’s aesthetics that I touched on above. This is necessary because 
it may well appear that the recently renewed focus on the treatment of artistic 
material in Hegel’s aesthetics must come to an abrupt halt in the case, 
specifically, of poetry. In the course of his elaboration of Hegel’s aesthetics in 
relation to Modernist artistic practice, Bernstein questions the degree to which 
Hegel’s relegation of matter relative to the spirit of the artist in her or his 
creative activity can be read as finally decisive. In particular, Bernstein expressly 
doubts the ultimate superiority of artworks over their materials that Hegel 
appears to insist upon in the passage from the Aesthetics that I quoted above: 
What is ominous in Hegel’s statement is the idea that it is a condition for nature to 
become a pure vehicle of mindedness that it be dead (stone, wood, canvas, sounds 
and words), as if spirit could only assure itself of its ultimate and unsurpassable 
authority through the slaughter of nature. What is eerie here is the way in which 
the metaphorical murder of nature as authority converges with the mediums [sic] 
of art being dead nature. Only if nature is really dead, so to speak, can the material 
basis of art that founds its sensuous character be an empty husk, a corpse, leaving 
only the mindedness of works as demanding attention, so that in works, finally, it 
is an issue of the mind knowing itself, and with that recognition the claim of art to 
be divine is forever surpassed. […] [But] if the authority of spirit reveals itself only 
in relation to that which it departs from, then the authority of spirit will depend 
on the presentation of the site of slaughter. In this […] way, then, might dead 
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nature belong to art’s animation? Might not the role of dead nature in art strike us, 
on a second reading, as not only ominous but also riven with ambiguity?16 
 
It might be objected to this statement that it histrionically overplays the 
antagonism between nature and artistic agency.17 After all, nobody has ever had 
to slaughter a block of marble prior to making a sculpture from it. We might 
point out that such an objection ought itself to be troubled by the fact that some 
of the materials, at least, of some artworks were indeed living before they were, 
if not slaughtered, then, at the euphemistic least, harvested before their 
formation into artworks. But more important still, what Bernstein is arguing 
here is that it is nature-as-authority that has been ‘metaphorical[ly]’ murdered – 
a metaphorical murder, nevertheless, that while it may not involve the slaughter 
of blocks of marble, does come to have really deleterious consequences for living 
nature. The overthrow of nature as authority, moreover, aligns in Hegel’s 
thinking with the insistence that art’s natural materials are dead, enlivened only 
by the artist’s manipulation of them. Bernstein’s point, however, and the point I 
wish to take from his exposition, is that repressed sensuous materiality returns 
to haunt the spirit that would animate it. 
 I want to pursue this insight in connection with poetry because, first, its 
material does not seem directly congruent with the material of the other arts 
and, second, there is an important flattening out of significant differences 
between different artistic materials in Bernstein’s account. Hegel’s argument 
that the animation of artworks is dependent upon spirit, not matter, is implicitly 
bolstered by the fact that the first item in his list of artistic materials – stone – is 
presented elsewhere in his work as the archetypal material and, as such, dead.18 
Hence stone’s deathliness sets the tone for the following listed materials. But it 
quickly becomes clear that not all of the materials listed are as straightforward, 
so to speak, as one another. Bernstein may speak in the above quotation of 
‘(stone, wood, canvas, sounds and words)’, and later of ‘(sound, color, line, paint, 
word, space, movement)’, but Hegel speaks not of sounds or words but instead 
rather more precisely of ‘an idea expressed in speech and letters’, or as Bernard 
Bosanquet’s earlier translation has it, an ‘idea, uttering itself in speech and 
letters’.19 The differing translations of Hegel’s actual description of the materials 
of poetry already suggest a significant difficulty with extending stone’s 
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deathliness to apply to poetic material. Bosanquet’s quite justifiable – even 
preferable – translation draws out the fact that the material of poetry is already 
active – it is an idea expressing itself – before the artist’s activity is brought to 
bear on it.20 Significantly, Bernstein is quite frank about the fact that modernist 
painting serves, in his book, ‘as a stand-in for modernist art generally’.21 
Nevertheless, both his reductive redaction of ‘an idea expressed in speech and 
letters’ to ‘sounds and words’ or just ‘words’, and his willingness to allow one 
materially specific art form to stand in for ‘art generally’, entails that there are 
aspects of the material specificity of artworks that are not confronted in this 
otherwise impressively rich work. 
 Having thus opened the possibility that the different materials of different 
art forms might repay particular scrutiny, the specific question that we must 
now ask concerns what significance the difference between ‘stone and wood’, on 
the one hand, and ‘an idea expressed in speech and letters’, on the other, might 
have. Taking the lead from Bernstein’s extremely suggestive reading, we might 
further ask if ‘an idea expressed in speech and letters’ is ‘slaughtered’ in the 
same way as stone, wood, canvas are slaughtered, since the former, as we have 
just seen, remains active even at the moment that it is made the substrate of art.  
 Hegel intimates an answer to this set of questions in his account of the 
development of the different arts in terms, specifically, of their different material 
constitutions. In an important respect, their development is their progressive 
dematerialisation. Of all the arts, poetry has the least to do with its own material, 
such that, Hegel claims, ‘the material through which it manifests itself retains for 
it only the value of a means (even if an artistically treated means) for the 
expression of spirit to spirit, and it has not the value of being a sensuous existent 
in which the spiritual content can find a corresponding reality.’ (A, II, 626) The 
means in question is sound, but unlike in music, Hegel continues, ‘sound in 
poetry is entirely filled with the spiritual world and the specific objects of ideas 
and contemplation, and it appears as the mere external designation of this 
content.’ (A, II, 627) This is certainly a loss, but it is one that is accompanied by a 
gain: ‘what poetry loses in external objectivity by being able to set aside its 
sensuous medium (so far as that may be permitted to any art), it gains in the 
inner objectivity of the views and ideas which poetic language sets before our 
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apprehension.’ (A, II, 899) Furthermore, the sense that poetry does not quite lose 
the concreteness of the arts that deal in, as it were, heavier matter is stated 
slightly later: ‘in the very field of inner ideas, perceptions, and feelings it 
broadens out into an objective world which does not altogether lose the 
determinate character of sculpture and painting.’ (A, II, 960) What both of these 
statements make clear is that, for Hegel, whatever the extent of its 
dematerialisation, poetry does not altogether lose the ‘determinate character’ 
more readily recognisable as a feature of the other arts. At the very least, even in 
the apparent setting aside of its own sensuous medium and concomitant 
withdrawal into the ‘field of inner ideas’, poetry does not merely disavow those 
features of the other arts guaranteed them by virtue of their sensuous media. 
One way of reading this aspect of Hegel’s theory of poetry is to point out that, 
however much he stresses poetry’s dematerialisation, what it in fact performs is 
the infiltration of an ‘objective world’ into spirit itself.   
 The degree to which any art that wishes to remain art can slough off its 
sensuous medium is, therefore, the crucial question, however much it may seek 
to shelter in parenthesis: poetry is ‘able to set aside its sensuous medium (so far 
as that may be permitted to any art)’. For if poetry is to be an art at all, we need 
to know at what point it must reign in its tendency to supersede its sensuous 
medium and, as it were, reincorporate it. In Hegel’s description of ‘poetry 
proper’, for instance, it becomes clear that when poetry is, in Hegel’s terms, most 
properly self-identical, it may actually be in danger of ceasing to be poetry 
altogether:  
[I]n the case of poetry proper it is a matter of indifference whether we read it or 
hear it read; it can even be translated into other languages without essential 
detriment to its value, and turned from poetry into prose, and in these cases it is 
related to quite different sounds from those of the original. (A, II, 964) 
 
That first sentence invites reading somewhat against its grain, so that it be taken 
not to declare that we may encounter poetry in one of two equally valid ways – 
either by reading it to ourselves or by listening to it read out loud – but rather as 
tacitly admitting that it is strictly indifferent to poetry whether we read it, hear 
it, or actually encounter it at all in any imaginable way, since, no matter what is 
done to it, it will nonetheless remain poetry. But just as it may be disconcerting 
to be told that poetry may be turned into prose and yet remain poetry, so Hegel 
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acknowledges a significant doubt concerning whether what he here calls ‘poetry 
proper’ and elsewhere ‘poetic conception’ is really poetry as art at all: ‘poetry 
destroys the fusion of spiritual inwardness with external existence to an extent 
that begins to be incompatible with the original conception of art, with the result 
that poetry runs the risk of losing itself in a transition from the region of sense 
into that of the spirit.’ (A, II, 968) One way to read this is as an admission that 
poetry is not – or, at some as yet unspecified but distinctly reachable point, may 
cease to be – art. In the next paragraph, Hegel emphasises that even if poetry ‘in 
its need for an artistic materialization makes straight for a strengthened 
sensuous impression’ (969), it can achieve this materialization only through 
recourse to elements foreign to itself and borrowed from painting (insofar as it 
may aspire towards painting’s depictive richness) or music (insofar as it may 
manipulate sounds), while at the same time it must continue to stress its 
spirituality if it is to remain ‘genuine poetry’.  
 As Hegel makes clear, it is not, however, just its status as art that poetry, 
in its withdrawal from the sensuous, imperils, but itself: ‘poetry,’ Hegel clearly 
states above, ‘runs the risk of losing itself’. Poetry’s condition is one of internal 
antagonism, in the specific sense that it must borrow from what it is not in order 
to be itself. So as to sustain itself as poetry, and keep itself from tipping over into 
philosophy, it must embrace the possibility that it will relapse into music. 
Amongst other things, this internal division – queasy tight-rope-walk between 
rival extremes rather than elegant equipoise, whatever Hegel himself wishes to 
claim (for example, A, II, 1035) – is what makes it at once so easy and so difficult 
to be a poet in comparison with any other artist (A, II, 997). Moreover, poetry’s 
reincorporation of the sensuous medium it had set aside can never be complete, 
since poetry’s loss of sensuous particularity and gain of ‘the proper objectivity of 
the inner life as inner’ (A, II, 898) is mirrored by sound’s loss of its connection to 
the spiritual content of ideas and its regaining of ‘independence’. To describe 
sound in poetry in this way – as independent, as having been effectively let loose 
– is to make clear that Hegel’s alternative description of sound as ‘accidental’ to 
poetry’s spiritual content can hardly be taken to mean that it has been 
superseded as merely irrelevant or derisory.  
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 It is necessary at this point to take account a bit more directly of the role 
of language in Hegel’s theory of poetry. Language, that is to say, occupies the 
central position in the highly charged force field that constitutes poetry’s 
identity. This essay started out by asking what it is that makes the material of 
poetry – ‘an idea expressed in speech and letters’ – distinct from the materials of 
the other arts. That statement is striking because it makes clear that ideas 
uttering themselves are the material of poetry and, in case we are tempted to 
think that ‘material’ in the designation ‘the material of poetry’ has become 
merely metaphorical, their expression occurs in ‘speech and letters’. The ideal-
material constitution of language is, of course, crucial here. For one thing, 
language is ‘the most malleable of materials, the direct property of the spirit’, 
which must nevertheless ‘be used, like stone, colour, and sound in the other arts’ 
(A, II, 972). A direct property of the spirit has, on this account, been materialised 
as what is to be used by the artist. Language is itself a twofold material, at once 
directly the possession of spirit and the exclusive basis of poetry’s perceptible 
existence. Poetry subsists, Hegel says, in a passage that I quote at length, 
not in wood, stone, or colour, but solely in language, where versification, accent, 
etc. are as it were the gestures of speech through which the spiritual subject-
matter gains an external existence. Now if we ask where we are to look, so to say, 
for the material basis of this mode of expression, the answer is that, since 
speaking does not exist, like a work of visual art, on its own account apart from 
the artist, it is the living man himself, the individual speaker, who alone is the 
support for the perceptible presence and actuality of a poetic production. Poetic 
works must be spoken, sung, declaimed, presented by living persons themselves, 
just as musical works have to be performed. We are of course accustomed to read 
epic and lyric poetry, and it is only dramatic poetry that we are accustomed to 
hear spoken and to see accompanied by gestures; but poetry is by nature 
essentially musical, and if it is to emerge as fully art it must not lack this 
resonance, all the more because this is the one aspect in virtue of which it really 
comes into connection with external existence. For printed or written letters, it is 
true, are also existent externally but they are only arbitrary signs for sounds and 
words. […] [But print], instead of actually giving us the sound and timing of the 
word, it leaves to our usual practice the transformation of what is seen into sound 
and temporal duration. Consequently, if we are satisfied with reading merely, this 
happens partly on account of the readiness with which we imagine as spoken 
what is seen, partly because poetry alone of all the arts is in its essential aspects 
already completely at home in the spiritual element and does not bring the chief 
thing to our minds through either ear or eye. But, precisely on account of this 
spirituality, poetry as art must not entirely strip itself of this aspect of actual 
external expression, at any rate if it wants to avoid the imperfection of e.g. a black 
and white sketch substituted for a painting produced by a master of colour. (A, II, 
1036) 
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Before expounding the specific significance of this passage’s discussion of 
language for poetry’s subsistence as art, it should at least be acknowledged that, 
at first sight, Hegel seems to be giving an airing to Socrates’ suspicion of writing 
as expressed by Plato in the Phaedrus: the written word, Socrates argues, is 
defenceless and thus impotently open to being exploited by anyone without the 
support of its author to explicate, defend, or, most controversially, withhold it 
when necessary.22 Hegel does think that, where poetry is concerned, written text 
is in an important sense deficient, but not for the same reasons that Socrates is 
wary of the invention of writing. For while Hegel begins from the premise that 
‘speaking does not exist, like a work of visual art, on its own account apart from 
the artist’, he strikingly does not insist in what follows from this that it must be 
the artist who speaks, sings, or declaims poetry, but rather, simply, ‘the living 
man himself’ or, even more generally, ‘living persons themselves’.  
 Then why, given the centrality of the declamation of living persons to 
Hegel’s account of poetry above, are we at all content with ‘reading merely’, with, 
that is, silent reading? Discussing the last supper and the institution of the 
Eucharist in ‘The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate’, Hegel draws an analogy 
between the Eucharistic consumption of bread and wine – which returns what 
had been rendered objective (in the form of food and drink) to its subjective 
status (love amongst communicants) – and the understanding of what is written 
in reading – wherein a thought rendered objective in the printed word is re-
intellectualised in comprehension. The analogy is imperfect, Hegel admits, 
because, in reading, the written word is not ‘read away’, a fact which, it is 
implied, entails the impurity of the process of intellectualisation in reading.23 
Hegel’s account of poetry, however, construes quite differently this apparent 
imperfection of the reading process. The two reasons for our habitual 
contentment with silent reading are, as with poetry’s own essential being as art, 
radically at odds. On the one hand, we are content to read poetry silently to 
ourselves because we readily ‘imagine’ as spoken what is seen in the act of 
reading. If the imagination of speech here is not to be illusory, then this must 
mean that we actually experience as inwardly spoken what we see written. To 
call this silent reading is to assume that there are no sounds in our heads, or that 
the only hearing that matters when we read is the hearing of other people, and 
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not our own. On the other hand, we are content with mere reading because 
poetry is, of all the arts, the most completely at home in spirit – but, as Hegel has 
repeatedly warned, if we allow it to settle down there, then it ceases altogether 
to be art.   
 But before we think that Hegel’s account of the materials of poetry sits 
comfortably within his account of language, we must think again. The enunciated 
– declaimed, sung – speech of poetry is, from Hegel’s point of view at another 
point in his work, language estranged and deformed. In the account of language 
in the Encyclopaedia Hegel deprecates just those features of poetry’s linguistic 
character that he explicitly mentions in the passage from the Aesthetics quoted 
above – ‘versification, accent, etc. […] the gestures of speech through which the 
spiritual subject-matter gains an external existence’. These features are just 
those features of language whose importance to the Chinese language is 
bemoaned in the Philosophy of Mind: 
The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: numbers of its words 
possess utterly different meanings, as many as ten and twenty, so that, in 
speaking, the distinction is made perceptible merely by accent and intensity, by 
speaking low and soft or crying out. The European, learning to speak Chinese, falls 
into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mastered these absurd 
refinements of accentuation. Perfection here consists in the opposite of that parler 
sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educated speaker.24  
  
The Chinese, speaking low, soft, or crying out, and in general with their routine 
manipulation of accent and intensity, seem here like they speak poetry all the 
time, whereas the apparently accentless European at least ought never to do so. 
What is here cast as linguistic excrescence, imperfection even, is, according to 
Hegel in the Aesthetics, essential to poetry’s matter. Moreover, in his recourse to 
the French maxim of educated speaking – that one ought parler sans accent – 
Hegel inadvertently suggests that, in fact, the elimination of accent is far from 
desirable; what is required, rather, is the correct adoption of the right one.25  
 Hegel’s deployment of parler sans accent as the motto of educated 
speaking brings once again into view the potential for writing to appear as the 
perfected instantiation of accentlessness. Of course, this is only true insofar as 
writing is not at all read. And is there not also discernible here a particular 
delight in a specifically French phrase, just at the moment that the importance of 
accentlessness is proclaimed? There is certainly an illicit pleasure taken in the 
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French terms for what is being dismissed at one moment in the Aesthetics as the 
all-too-Gallic foppery of the character of Ahasuerus as portrayed by Racine in 
that playwright’s Esther, ‘en habit français’ and in ‘hose of drap d’or’ (A, I, 268). 
Although there is no trace of Hegel ever having seen Esther performed, we may 
speculate that he is nevertheless thinking of a particular performance here, since 
nowhere does Racine’s text insist on habit français or hose of drap d’or (or of any 
other material, for that matter).26 Or, perhaps, Hegel is just enjoying the act of 
enunciating these terms, even as he holds up their Gallicism to be mocked.27 
* 
Hegel’s treatment of vocal quirks and, furthermore, the traces of them in the 
written record of his own lectures bring into view the insistence of utterance in 
his thinking about poetry. This essay has sought to show via its reading of Hegel 
that, first, there are significant, rather than merely ephemeral, differences 
between the materials of the different arts. Thanks to its basis in language, 
poetry is the most spiritual art of all, but it must nevertheless retain its material 
moment if it is to be art at all, which it does, according to Hegel, specifically in its 
repeated declamations by living people. In beginning its enquiry into Hegel’s 
statements on the matter of poetry, this essay, moreover, took its lead from 
Bernstein’s dark, trenchant reading of the materiality of art in Hegel’s aesthetics. 
Bernstein shows that the baptism of spirit, administered by the artist, depends 
upon the assumption that the matter baptised is dead. But specifically poetic 
material is not construable as a site of slaughter, as the presentation of a 
mortified nature, however much Hegel’s emphasis on the priority of spirit in art 
may be viewed as requiring it. On the contrary, both spirit and matter 
inseparably together – ‘an idea expressed in speech and letters’ – are the matter 
of the poet’s spiritual working. What this must entail for poetics is the 
recognition that no poetry – if it is to be art or even, in fact, if it is to be poetry – is 
finally reducible to its ideational content, not least because its self-uttering ideas 
are already its material. It is, therefore, poetry, of all the arts, which shows that 
no cordon sanitaire can finally be erected between what is living and what is 
dead in the artwork. 
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American Comparative Literature Association (New York, 2014) and at the 
Literary Theory Seminar, Faculty of English, University of Cambridge (Lent term, 
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